Changelog

Every release of the v1 API, newest first. Versions follow semver, and a breaking change gets at least six months of notice with Deprecation and Sunset headers. The same list as JSON: changelog.json.

Current version 1.42.0 · 51 releases

November 2026

v1.42.0

A decision on a held MCP call can say why it overrides AtmanID's suggestion; a later version will require the reason fields.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/mcp/authorize/holds/{id}/decision — New in 1.42.0: an optional category, the reason for a decision that goes against AtmanID's suggestion (approving a HIGH or CRITICAL hold, or denying a MEDIUM or LOW one), with the values the console offers; the audit record carries it as new_state.override_category, as a console decision does, and an unknown value is 400 VALIDATION_ERROR naming the field. Nothing changes for a request without it, and nothing is refused today. In a later version, announced with its date before it takes effect, a decision on a HIGH or CRITICAL hold will require note, and a decision against the suggestion will require category. To be ready now, send note with every decision and category with every approve: gateway holds are created at HIGH risk. Until then the audit record of a decision without them carries new_state.reason_rule (mode api_key_exempt) naming what was missing, so you can find the calls to change.
v1.41.0

A joiner rehires a person whose ordinary leaver an administrator ran; only an emergency termination still refuses it.

  • ChangedPOST /api/v1/jml/joiner for a deprovisioned person: 409 CONFLICT with details.reason emergency_termination is now answered only when an administrator terminated them in an emergency (Terminate now) and HR has not reconciled it. A person an administrator offboarded with an ordinary leaver (the Leaver action, bulk, the assistant, offboard now) from this version on is rehired (202) like any other leaver, with the same checks and API key revocation. People offboarded that way before this version keep the emergency marker and are still refused until reconciled or reinstated. No new error code.
v1.40.0

A user's app_account_count counts their active application accounts; it was always 0.

  • FixedGET /api/v1/users/{id}: app_account_count returned 0 for every person, because the count looked for an account status that is never stored. It now counts the person's active accounts in applications of your tenant — accounts correlated to them by a sync or provisioned for them (accounts that are pending, disabled, suspended, orphaned or deprovisioned are not counted). The field's type and presence are unchanged; a value that was 0 may now be higher. GET /api/v1/users does not return the field, as before.
v1.39.0

Audit records of an access review decision say which of the three review facts were on the reviewer's screen.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/audit: the record of a reviewer's decision on an access review item (ACCESS_CERTIFIED, CERT_ROLE_CERTIFIED, ACCESS_REVOKE_QUEUED, CERT_ROLE_REVOKED, ACCESS_REVIEW_ESCALATED, CERT_ADMIN_OVERRIDE, CERT_AGENT_TOOL_GRANT_REVOKED / _REVOKE_FAILED, CERT_MCP_SERVER_RETIRE_REQUESTED / _RETIRED / _RETIRE_FAILED) written by the console's decision paths carries new_state.state_version 2 and, when the decision was made on a screen that showed the item, new_state.facts_shown: { last_used, peers, original_reason }, booleans, true for each fact that screen showed for the item (a value or its honest "none"). It is the screen's report, as context_was_shown is. Absent when no screen reported it — a decision through POST /api/v1/certifications/reviews/{id}/decision, the offline review sheet, or any record written before this version — which means not recorded, not false. Records without state_version are version 1; the assistant's (Iris chat) certify and revoke records stay version 1, and its escalations are version 2 without facts_shown. Existing keys are unchanged. Additive.
v1.38.0

A joiner for a person who left rehires them only when their departure is settled, and revokes the API keys they created.

  • SecurityPOST /api/v1/jml/joiner for a deprovisioned person: the rehire now runs the checks an identity provider's rehire runs. It answers 409 CONFLICT, changing nothing, when the departure was run by an administrator and not yet reconciled with HR (details.reason emergency_termination), when their leaver steps or revocation tickets are still open (leaver_steps_pending, revocation_tickets_open — retry later), when a contractor or vendor's end date has passed (not_reinstatable), or when they are no longer a leaver (not_deprovisioned). A rehire revokes every API key the person created, clears their old termination date, and sends IDENTITY_REACTIVATED. Rehires that previously failed with 500 now succeed. No new error code.
v1.37.0

An approver's chosen end date counts at every stage of a multi-stage access request.

  • FixedPOST /api/v1/access-requests/{id}/decision: expires_at sent with an APPROVE at a stage that does not complete the request (an earlier stage, or a vote a quorum stage still waits on) was dropped; only the completing approval's own date was applied. Every approver's date now counts: the grant ends at the earliest one. An earlier stage's date never makes the access last longer than the request asked for; only the approval that completes the request may set a later date, as before.
  • ChangedPOST /api/v1/access-requests/{id}/decision: an APPROVE that would complete a request is refused with 409 INVALID_STATE (an existing code) when a date an earlier approver chose has already passed — approving would grant access that is already expired. Nothing is decided; reject the request instead.
v1.36.0

Audit records of an agent's action name the four identities behind it: the person, the delegation, the agent and the workload.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/audit: a record of a registered agent's action carries new_state.agent_identities with v 1. person is whom the agent acts for: its owner at the time, as user_id, with basis "owner"; null when it has none. delegation is the authority it acted under. Its kind is mcp_grant, admin_token, invocation, agent_delegation or none. It also has grant_id, granted_by, token_id, ceiling_person_id (the person whose authority caps the token) and chain_id. agent has id and name. workload is where it ran: source (call, mint, token_binding or registry), outcome (the workload check's result, e.g. MATCH, MISMATCH, NOT_REGISTERED), identity_id, issuer_id and sub. On a MISMATCH from a workload the agent is not registered as, issuer_id and sub name the workload the call came from. missing lists the parts that could not be found. unresolved is true when they could not be read in time; only what the writer already knew is then kept. People appear by user id only. The records an agent's confirmed change writes as its owner carry the same key, with kind invocation. The records: MCP_TOOL_CALL, MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_ISSUED, MCP_TOKEN_ISSUED, MCP_UPSTREAM_TOKEN_ISSUED, MCP_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_GRANTED / _REFUSED, MCP_WRITE_HELD, MCP_AGENT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, AGENT_MCP_SCOPE_OVER_CEILING, GATEWAY_RESOURCE_UNRESOLVED, agent_intent_*, and AGENT_SESSION_STARTED / _ENDED when the agent opens or closes its session. GATEWAY_RESOURCE_UNRESOLVED now also has actor_type agent.
v1.35.0

POST /mcp/authorize can pass the agent's workload identity token, for the workload check; an approval whose SoD re-check could not run can be refused instead of passing as clean.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/mcp/authorize: agent_credential.workload (optional) carries the agent's Workload-Identity-Token header — its workload's signed identity (a SPIFFE JWT-SVID, a Kubernetes service-account token, a Google Cloud or Azure identity token) — or null when the agent sent none. An empty string counts as none. AtmanID checks it against the workloads the agent is registered to run as (warn mode: nothing is refused for it yet). For a tool call the result is recorded on the decision in Events (a call enforce would refuse shows as would-deny with reason WORKLOAD_<outcome>); it is not returned in this response. mode: "authenticate" accepts it too: there the result is counted for enforce readiness, and an allow records no decision. Omit the field if your gateway does not forward that header: the call is then decided as before and not checked for its workload.
  • AddedPOST /api/v1/access-requests/{id}/decision: when the final-stage Separation-of-Duties re-check could not run, the approval is refused with 409 CONFLICT, message "SoD check failed, needs review" and a new details.sod_check_failed (true) alongside details.sod_blocked; details.conflicts is empty and the request stays PENDING. Warn mode first: until a tenant turns enforcement on (sod.gate_fail_closed_enforce), the approval goes ahead as before and the failure is recorded. No new error code.
v1.34.0

A rejected access request is sent as ACCESS_REQUEST_REJECTED; its old ACCESS_REVOKED form is deprecated.

  • AddedThe ACCESS_REQUEST_REJECTED webhook event is sent when an approver rejects an access request (in the console, by bulk reject, from an approval email, the assistant or POST /api/v1/access-requests/{id}/decision), with request_id, ref_code, requester_id, entitlement, application, decision (REJECTED), stage and total_stages. It was offered on /api/v1/webhooks but never sent; it is no longer named in an EVENT_NOT_AVAILABLE warning, and it is offered in the console.
  • DeprecatedA rejection sent as ACCESS_REVOKED with decision REJECTED. It is still sent, with the same data, alongside ACCESS_REQUEST_REJECTED until 2027-06-01; after that date a rejection is sent as ACCESS_REQUEST_REJECTED only. ACCESS_REVOKED for an executed revocation ticket is unchanged. A subscription to both events receives two deliveries for one rejection until then (dedupe on data.request_id). Subscribe to ACCESS_REQUEST_REJECTED and stop reading decision REJECTED from ACCESS_REVOKED before then.
v1.33.0

A webhook subscription is told when it names an event that is not sent yet.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/webhooks and PATCH /api/v1/webhooks/{id}: an event in events that AtmanID does not send yet is named in a new warnings[] entry (code EVENT_NOT_AVAILABLE, events) on the 201 / 200 response. Those events used to be accepted silently and never delivered. Each one comes off this list in the release that starts sending it.
  • AddedThe identity-lifecycle webhook events are sent from every path that makes the change, so they are no longer on that list: JOINER_PROVISIONED, MOVER_UPDATED, LEAVER_DEPROVISIONED, IDENTITY_SUSPENDED, IDENTITY_REACTIVATED, CONTRACTOR_EXPIRING and CONTRACTOR_EXPIRED. Each carries user_id, email and a source naming the path; the webhook event reference lists every field.
  • AddedNew error code EVENT_NOT_AVAILABLE (400, details.events). Warn mode first: until a tenant turns enforcement on (webhooks.unsent_event_refuse_enforce), the subscription is saved with the warning; once on, it is refused and nothing is saved. PATCH judges only the events it adds: re-sending a subscription's list, or not setting events, is never refused.

October 2026

v1.32.0

A call that loosens a control can wait for its key owner to confirm it with MFA.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/confirmations/{id} (tag Confirmations): a change that waits for a person's MFA confirmation — pending, rejected, or confirmed with the result the original call would have returned. Needs the scope the original call needed. New error code CONFIRMATION_EXPIRED (409): nobody confirmed it within 15 minutes and nothing was changed.
  • AddedPATCH /api/v1/mcp/servers/{id}/mode (lowering a mode), POST /api/v1/mcp/authorize/holds/{id}/decision (approving a HIGH or CRITICAL hold) and POST /api/v1/access-requests/{id}/decision (approving access whose highest-risk entitlement (on the request, in its cart, or in the requested role) is HIGH or CRITICAL) can answer 202 with { confirmation }: nothing is changed until the key's owner, or another person allowed to make the decision, confirms it with MFA in the console. Deny, reject and tightening calls are never held.
  • ChangedWarn mode first: until a tenant turns enforcement on (api.confirm_loosening_enforce), these calls are applied as before and recorded as API_CONFIRMATION_WOULD_REQUIRE. Handle the 202 now; it is what the call returns once enforcement is on.
v1.31.0

Webhook deliveries carry a timestamped signature, and a rotated secret keeps signing it for an overlap window.

  • AddedEvery webhook delivery carries X-AtmanID-Signature: t=<Unix seconds>,v1=<hex HMAC-SHA256 of "<t>.<raw body>">, signed afresh on every attempt, so a receiver can refuse a replayed delivery. X-Webhook-Signature is unchanged.
  • AddedAfter a secret rotation, X-AtmanID-Signature carries a second v1 made with the old secret for the overlap window (24 hours by default; 0 to 168 hours, chosen when rotating), so a receiver can switch secrets without rejecting deliveries.
  • ChangedEvery new or rotated signing secret is whsec_ followed by 64 hexadecimal characters; the admin Webhooks page and rotation issued 64 hexadecimal characters with no prefix. Secrets already issued keep working: the whole string is the HMAC key.
v1.30.0

An access request's approval chain says who decided each stage.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/access-requests/{id}: each approval_chain item gains decided_by (the person who decided — the approver, their delegate, or an administrator overriding), decided_by_policy (sla_auto_rejected, sla_auto_approved or sla_closed_unreached when a deadline policy decided instead of a person) and admin_override. The response is now documented as returned (AccessRequestDetail, ApprovalChainItem): the spec pointed this operation at AccessRequest, whose requester, status and source differ.
  • Changedapproval_chain: comments is null on a row a deadline policy decided (its internal "[sla-escalate] …" note is no longer returned — read decided_by_policy); approver_name is null, not " ", when the approver cannot be read; within a stage, a PENDING row comes first while the stage is open, then the row that decided, then rows closed without deciding.
  • FixedAn admin's override, a delegate's decision and an SLA auto-approval read as the assigned approver's own decision. approver_* still names who the stage was assigned to; read decided_by for who decided.
v1.29.1

A campaign's evidence lists every item it reviewed.

  • FixedGET /api/v1/certifications/campaigns/{id}/evidence listed app-entitlement items only: a campaign over platform roles, NHIs, agent tool grants, MCP servers or API scopes exported a header and no rows. It now has one row per reviewed item; Application, email and department are blank where they do not apply. Columns and parameters are unchanged. The console export had the same gap and is fixed with it.
v1.29.0

Certification campaigns by API, and the MCP gateway's decision log.

  • AddedGET/POST /api/v1/certifications/campaigns, GET /api/v1/certifications/campaigns/{id}, GET .../{id}/reviews and GET .../{id}/evidence (CSV) — the console's campaigns, launch and evidence export. New scopes read:certifications and write:certifications.
  • AddedPOST /api/v1/certifications/reviews/{id}/decision — certify, revoke or escalate one item as the key's owner, with every console check (justification policy, override justification, self-certification, cancelled campaign). New scope decide:certifications.
  • AddedGET /api/v1/mcp/decisions — the gateway's allow / deny / hold / would-deny / bypass decisions in a window of at most 31 days, filtered by decision, agent, server, tool, deny reason or calling gateway; paginated with a total. New scope read:mcp_decisions.
v1.28.0

Manage agent intent policies and switch MCP servers between shadow and enforce by API.

  • AddedGET/POST /api/v1/agent-policies, GET/PATCH /api/v1/agent-policies/{id} and POST /api/v1/agent-policies/simulate — list, read, create and change the intent policies the gateway evaluates, and test what they decide for one call. New scopes read:agent_policies and write:agent_policies; the owner needs the console's intent-policy permissions.
  • AddedGET /api/v1/mcp/servers, GET /api/v1/mcp/servers/{id}, GET /api/v1/mcp/servers/{id}/mode-preview and PATCH /api/v1/mcp/servers/{id}/mode — the servers, their enforcement modes, what ENFORCE would deny (last 7 days and the intent coverage), and the switch between shadow and enforce. New scopes read:mcp_servers and write:mcp_servers.
v1.27.0

Decide held MCP calls and access requests by API, as the person who owns the key.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/mcp/authorize/holds/{id}/decision — approve or deny a call /mcp/authorize answered with hold. New scope mcp:decide; the key's owner must hold the agent-oversight permission. Recorded as a console decision (channel api, with the API key id).
  • AddedPOST /api/v1/access-requests/{id}/decision — approve or reject the current stage of an access request as the key's owner, who must be an approver of that stage; every console check applies (self-approval, one vote per person, SoD re-check). New scope decide:access_requests.
  • AddedError codes ALREADY_DECIDED (409) and HOLD_EXPIRED (409).
v1.26.0

Deactivating an agent revokes everything it holds, and a deactivated agent stays deactivated.

  • FixedPOST /api/v1/agents/{id}/deactivate set the agent DEPROVISIONED and soft-deleted it, but left its MCP tokens, sessions, MCP access grants, API keys, JIT sessions, delegations and agent-to-agent grants live. It now decommissions: all of them are revoked in the same transaction. Request and response are unchanged.
  • ChangedA DEPROVISIONED agent can no longer change status by any route (the database refuses it), and receives no API key, delegation, JIT session or session (409 AGENT_NOT_ACTIVE on the console routes).
v1.25.0

Audit records of AI-assisted actions say how they were invoked: a workflow step, a confirmation card, Slack or a standing grant.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/audit: confirmation_method takes the values workflow_step_confirm (a workflow step its person confirmed at the step's prompt), none (a workflow step that ran without a per-step confirmation) and slack_button (a proposal confirmed in Slack), and documents agent_autonomous_remediation. The records an AI-assisted action itself writes while it runs (the change it makes, and any check it raises) carry new_state.invocation: invocation_version (1), channel, on_behalf_of, confirmed_by, confirmed_at, workflow_id, step_id and agent_nhi_id. The assistant's own summary record of a chat or Slack action, and workflow lifecycle records, carry their own fields instead.
  • AddedWorkflow lifecycle records: AGENT_WORKFLOW_TRIGGERED for every start (the app, the assistant, a trigger rule or a schedule — new_state.triggered_via), workflow.step_confirmed, workflow.step_failed, workflow.step_skipped, workflow.failure_resumed, workflow.paused and workflow.resumed by the engine (a hold or renewal; new_state.pause_reason), workflow.completed and workflow.failed.
  • FixedAn action run by a workflow step was recorded as a person confirming a proposal card (actor_type = human, confirmation_method = proposal_card), including steps that ran unconfirmed. It is now actor_type = agent, delegated_by the person, with the confirmation it actually had.
  • ChangedRecords the assistant writes take the console's shape. A certification review revoked through the assistant records CERT_ROLE_REVOKED (a role) or ACCESS_REVOKE_QUEUED on the reviewed access, under the reviewer's user id, instead of CERTIFICATION_REVOKED on the review under their email (a bulk revoke still records CERTIFICATION_REVOKED). AGENT_SUSPENDED keeps its name and now targets AI_AGENT (was AGENT) with the kill switch's fields (agent_name, new_status, severance_sla_ms; suspended_by and channel are replaced by new_state.invocation). A user-scoped SoD scan records only SOD_USER_SCAN_COMPLETED (it also wrote a SOD_SCAN_COMPLETED). A workflow's audit step records workflow.event.<name> (it recorded the template's name as the action type).
v1.24.0

POST /access-requests refuses a request that nobody could approve.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/access-requests returns 422 NO_ELIGIBLE_APPROVER when an approval stage of the request has nobody eligible to decide it (every candidate is excluded, for example the tenant has no administrator left who is not the requester or the person receiving the access); details.stages names the stages. No request is created. Before, the request was created PENDING with no approver and could never progress. A request for several entitlements submits the items that can be decided and lists the others in no_approver_items (entitlement, app, stages); when none can be, it answers the 422 with details.no_approver_items, and nothing is created. Only while the tenant enforces it (access_requests.refuse_without_approver); until then such a request is created as before, and shows as stranded in the Request Explorer.
v1.23.1

The spec is generated with a patched schema library; no request or response changes.

  • SecurityBuilt with zod 4.6.7, which fixes GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 (memory exhaustion while validating oversized constrained collections).
  • ChangedSpec text only: nullable fields are written type: [T, "null"] instead of anyOf (equivalent in OpenAPI 3.1), and the documented date-time pattern requires seconds. Every response already carries seconds; the at, since and until parameters are parsed as before. Regenerated clients may change shape, not behaviour.
v1.23.0

The agent register, update and deactivate calls act once per idempotency_key, even when retries race.

  • AddedNew error codes IDEMPOTENCY_IN_PROGRESS (409) and IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (422) on POST /api/v1/agents, PATCH /api/v1/agents/{id} and POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/deactivate.
  • FixedTwo concurrent requests with the same idempotency_key could both act (two agents registered, or one change applied twice). The key is now claimed before anything is done: while the first request runs, another with the key gets 409 IDEMPOTENCY_IN_PROGRESS; after it, the cached replay (HTTP 200, cached: true, unchanged). A request that was refused or changed nothing is not cached, as before: a retry runs again.
  • ChangedThe same idempotency_key with a different request body within 24 hours is refused 422 IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (nothing is done); it used to return the first request's cached response. Send a new key for a new request.
v1.22.0

GET /jml/status lists a run's per-application errors as fixed labels, and its 200 response is documented as it is.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/jml/status/{idempotency_key}: errors lists a partial or failed run's per-application errors, which the event never carried before (runs finished before 1.22.0 carry none). Each entry is { app_id, app_name, message }: message is a fixed label (for example "Timed out"), never the connector's own error text, which can carry hostnames, account names or tokens; app_name is null for a joiner run.
  • FixedThe spec documented this route with the JmlResult shape of the joiner, mover and leaver calls, which it never returned. Its 200 response is now documented as it is (JmlStatus): event_type, status (pending, in_progress, pending_approval, completed, partial, failed), hris_system, effective_date, completed_at, queued_at, result (set for completed only, as before) and errors.
v1.21.0

POST /mcp/authorize can authenticate an agent without deciding a tool call.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/mcp/authorize accepts mode: "authenticate" with server_id, agent_credential and caller (no tool, no arguments). The answer is allow when the agent's token, and its DPoP proof when the token is bound, is valid for that server, and deny otherwise; it is never hold, no tool policy is applied and handling is null. Use it for the MCP messages that carry no tool call: initialize, ping, tools/list, notifications, the GET event stream and DELETE. A body without mode is a tool call, decided as before.
v1.20.0

POST /access-requests refuses a request for a person who has left the organisation.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/access-requests returns 422 PERSON_DEPARTED when target_user_id is a person who has left (status Inactive, Expired or Terminated, or a status the lifecycle does not know); no request is created and details.target_status carries the status. A Deprovisioned target still returns 422 USER_DEPROVISIONED, which is now in the documented error codes and also carries details.target_status.
v1.19.3

The WebhookEvent enum lists the event names the webhook routes really accept and send.

  • FixedThe documented WebhookEvent enum listed dotted names (access_request.created, …) that no route ever accepted; it now lists the names the routes accept and the dispatcher sends (USER_CREATED, …). A subscription's events in responses is documented as a list of strings, since subscriptions created in the console can carry console-only events. No request that worked before fails.
v1.19.2

POST /reachability/preview reports confidence from live paths only.

  • FixedPOST /api/v1/reachability/preview counts a cached summary toward confidence only while the entitlement still has transitive paths; a summary of nothing mapped is none (or low when edges exist). Same enum values.
v1.19.1

PATCH /webhooks/{id} applies the same rules as create.

  • SecurityPATCH /api/v1/webhooks/{id} checks the merged event set against the key's tier, as POST does: a standard-tier key may not add partner-tier events (403 RBAC_DENIED, listing them), and a changed url must pass the outbound URL policy (400 INVALID_PARAM). Existing error codes; new cases on PATCH.
v1.19.0

JML joiner and mover report a manager they could not set, instead of setting one who has left.

  • AddedNew error code PERSON_DEPARTED — the one code for "this person has left the organization". The JML result gains warnings[] (code, field, message).
  • ChangedPOST /jml/joiner no longer sets a manager_email that names a person who has left the organization (terminated, deprovisioned or access ended): the person is created with no manager and the response carries a PERSON_DEPARTED warning. POST /jml/mover leaves the manager unchanged in that case, still applying the department and title, with the same warning. An address that matches no current user gives a NOT_FOUND warning (the joiner sets no manager, the mover leaves it unchanged, as before). Each skip is recorded in the audit trail (JML_MANAGER_DEPARTED_SKIPPED / JML_MANAGER_NOT_FOUND_SKIPPED). Manager addresses now match case-insensitively.
v1.18.3

PATCH /bundles/{id} refuses item changes on a bundle whose approvals go to a chosen approver.

  • SecurityThe items of a bundle with approval_override_user_id set cannot be changed through the API: the call returns 403, as it already did for a bundle that grants without approval. New items would route to that one approver; an administrator changes them in the console.
v1.18.0

A gateway that decides through the authorization API can report how each allowed call went, and every decision now tells it how to handle the call: whether to count or redact personal data in the response, and whether a call AtmanID cannot decide may go through.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/mcp/authorize/decisions/{decisionId}/outcome — the MCP server's status, the latency, the inspection flags your gateway raised on the response and how many personal-data values it redacted, recorded on the decision's gateway event. Once per allowed decision. Scope: mcp:authorize.
  • AddedPOST /api/v1/mcp/authorize answers carry handling: redact.count / redact.enforce (the server's personal-data setting and whether the tenant enforces redaction) and offline_fail_open (whether a later call AtmanID cannot decide may be forwarded undecided — the tenant's mcp.stdio_offline_fail_open setting, never on a HIGH or CRITICAL server). Null when the agent was not authenticated for the server.
v1.17.0

A scan of a device's desktop MCP clients can report the local MCP servers they launch; they appear in the MCP Hub as discovered, with where they were seen.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/mcp/local-servers/report — what atmanid-mcp-scan found: the device and every MCP server its client configs declare (command and masked arguments, or URL). Each distinct server becomes a discovered MCP server, each place it was seen a sighting. Required scope: mcp:report (new).
  • AddedNew API key scope mcp:report. The key's creator must be allowed to manage MCP servers.
v1.16.1

Fix: the audit entry's action_type example showed a webhook event name instead of an audit event name.

  • FixedAuditEntry.action_type: the example was access_request.approved, which is a webhook event. Audit event names are upper case with underscores (ACCESS_REQUEST_SUBMITTED). Every name is listed in the audit event reference (docs.atmanid.com/reference/audit-events/). No field changed.
v1.16.0

Envoy can put AtmanID in front of standard MCP servers: ext_authz reads MCP JSON-RPC messages sent to /{server_id}/mcp.

  • Added/api/v1/mcp/ext-authz/{path} also accepts an agent path ending in /{server_id}/mcp, the standard MCP protocol (Streamable HTTP). A JSON-RPC tools/call is decided like any tool call, with params.name as the tool and params.arguments as the arguments. initialize, ping, tools/list and notifications are allowed when the agent's credential is valid for the server. Any other method, a batch, or a body that is not a JSON-RPC message is refused (x-atmanid-decision: invalid, with x-atmanid-reason MCP_METHOD_NOT_GOVERNED or MCP_MESSAGE_INVALID). Paths ending in /{server_id}/tools/{tool} are unchanged.
v1.15.1

Fix: the status of a held MCP call could not be read — hold ids are not UUIDs.

  • FixedGET /api/v1/mcp/authorize/holds/{id} answered 400 for every real hold: it expected a UUID, but a hold id is the approval request's id (for example hitl-eval-mu8x2k4fab). hold.id and the path parameter are now strings.
v1.15.0

Envoy can ask AtmanID about MCP tool calls through its ext_authz filter: 200 allows the call, 403 refuses or holds it.

  • Added/api/v1/mcp/ext-authz/{path} — Envoy ext_authz HTTP service for MCP tool calls, any method. The API key (scope mcp:authorize) goes in x-atmanid-api-key, because Envoy forwards the agent's own Authorization header. The decision is in x-atmanid-decision; every answer except allow is a 403.
v1.14.0

Your API gateway (Kong, Envoy, a custom gateway) can ask AtmanID to allow, deny or hold an agent's MCP tool call — the same decision and audit trail as the AtmanID gateway.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/mcp/authorize — the decision on one MCP tool call: the agent's credential and arguments in, allow / deny / hold out. A decision is always 200; 503 means no decision could be made and the call must be denied. Required scope: mcp:authorize (new).
  • AddedGET /api/v1/mcp/authorize/holds/{id} — the status of a held call (pending, approved, rejected, expired, used). Once approved, send the same call again: it is allowed once. Required scope: mcp:authorize.
  • AddedNew API key scope mcp:authorize. The key's creator must be allowed to manage MCP servers.
v1.13.0

JML events created through the API now complete: the leaver is processed automatically on the termination date, and every event reports its outcome.

  • ChangedPOST /api/v1/jml/leaver — on the termination date AtmanID now runs the full leaver workflow (connector deprovisioning, revocation tickets for disconnected apps, session and token revocation, owned-agent deactivation). Before, the daily run only marked accounts deprovisioned inside AtmanID (since 2026-10-10).
  • ChangedGET /api/v1/jml/status/{idempotency_key} — an event no longer stays pending forever. When the matching workflow runs for the person (the leaver automatically on the termination date or when started by an administrator; joiner and mover when an administrator starts them), the event becomes completed, partial or failed, with account and ticket counts. Integrations that wait for a final status now receive one (since 2026-10-10).
  • FixedPOST /api/v1/jml/joiner and /mover — documentation and the response message now say that these calls grant no access by themselves: the event is pending until an administrator runs the joiner or mover workflow. The joiner message previously said provisioning was queued (2026-10-10).
v1.12.0

Records the contract changes shipped since 1.11.0 — a new EXPIRED user status, stricter name validation, pagination and webhook behaviour, and documentation corrections.

  • ChangedWorkflow template manifests now use apiVersion atmanid.com/v1. The earlier label is still accepted on input and is rewritten to atmanid.com/v1, so existing manifests and GitOps pipelines keep working.
  • ChangedUser status can now be EXPIRED — an external identity (contractor, vendor) whose end date has passed. Applies to GET /api/v1/users, GET /api/v1/users/{id} and the status filter on GET /api/v1/users (since 2026-09-29). Integrations that switch on status should handle the new value.
  • ChangedPOST /api/v1/jml/joiner — first_name and last_name reject control, zero-width and bidirectional-formatting characters with a 400 validation error. Every script and real name punctuation is still accepted (since 2026-09-14).
  • Changedtotal_pages in paginated responses is always at least 1, including for an empty result. The spec previously documented ceil(total / limit), which is 0 for an empty result, and some routes returned that (since 2026-09-12).
  • ChangedPOST /api/v1/webhooks — if the audit record for a new subscription cannot be written, the subscription is not created, no signing secret is issued, and the call returns 500 (since 2026-09-28).
  • ChangedWrite endpoints (access requests, agents, GitHub discovery, bundles, JML, webhooks, workflow templates) and POST /api/v1/reachability/preview now also check the current role permissions of the user who owns the API key. A key whose owner has lost the matching permission gets 403 RBAC_DENIED, even if the key still holds the scope (since 2026-09-05).
  • ChangedPOST /api/v1/jml/mover — a manager change is rejected with 400 VALIDATION_ERROR when it would make a user their own manager or create a reporting loop, and with 404 NOT_FOUND when the manager does not exist (since 2026-09-17).
  • AddedGET /api/v1/audit — new agent_nhi_id query filter; each event also carries agent_nhi_id and agent_name when an agent performed it (since 2026-09-18).
  • FixedGET /api/v1/identities — documentation corrected: it lists non-human identities and requires the read:nhi scope, as the route always did. The spec had said cross-source identity records and read:users (2026-09-09).
  • Fixedsort_by values that match built-in object property names (for example constructor) no longer cause a 500; they fall back to the default sort, like any other unknown value (since 2026-09-23).
  • FixedWebhook verification guide corrected: deliveries carry X-Webhook-Signature (sha256=<hex>), X-Delivery-ID, X-Attempt-Number, X-Event-Type and X-Webhook-ID. There is no timestamp header — deduplicate on the body's event id, which is stable across retries (2026-10-08).
  • SecurityError responses no longer include internal error text; error codes are unchanged (since 2026-09-26).
  • SecurityOutbound webhook signing secrets are stored encrypted at rest. Signatures and verification are unchanged (2026-10-08).

August 2026

v1.11.0

Audit API now surfaces who — or what — actually performed each action.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/audit response — new fields actor_type (human or agent), delegated_by, confirmation_method, and agent_session_id.
  • AddedGET /api/v1/audit — new actor_type query filter.
  • Fixedconfirmation_method on audit events recorded before 2026-08-26 does not yet distinguish a standing-authorization execution from a human-confirmed one — both read the same legacy value. Only events from this date forward carry the corrected distinction.

June 2026

v1.10.0

Dual agent ownership — a managing team, distinct from the accountable individual, with team-aware offboarding.

  • AddedAgentSummary response — new owner_group_id and owner_group_name fields: the agent's managing team (approver group), independent of owner_id/owner_user_name (the accountable individual). An agent may have either, both, or neither.
  • AddedPOST /api/v1/agents body — optional owner_group_name field to set the managing team. New error code OWNER_GROUP_NOT_FOUND when the name does not resolve to an existing approver group.
  • ChangedOffboarding behavior: an agent with only an individual owner is deprovisioned when that person leaves, as before. An agent with a managing team is now reassigned to the team (its accountable owner is cleared, the agent keeps running) instead of being deprovisioned.

May 2026

v1.9.0

GitOps workflow templates — manifest-shaped CRUD for ApprovalWorkflowTemplate, consumed by the atmanid/workflow-sync GitHub Action.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/workflow-templates — list workflow templates in the tenant. Required scope: read:workflows. New scope added in this version.
  • AddedPOST /api/v1/workflow-templates — apply manifest. Body accepts JSON or YAML (apiVersion: atmanid.com/v1 — originally published under an earlier label, still accepted — kind: ApprovalWorkflowTemplate). Required scope: write:workflows. Used by the atmanid/workflow-sync GitHub Action to commit approval-workflow templates as code.
  • AddedGET /api/v1/workflow-templates/{id} — read by id OR metadata.name (the route resolves both). Required scope: read:workflows.
  • AddedDELETE /api/v1/workflow-templates/{id} — delete a workflow template (soft delete: it is marked deleted, never hard-deleted). Required scope: write:workflows.
  • AddedTwo new API key scopes: read:workflows + write:workflows. Mint a key with these scopes selected before calling /api/v1/workflow-templates/*.
v1.8.0

W3C Trace Context propagation on every /api/* response — distributed-trace continuity for customers running OpenTelemetry collectors.

  • AddedX-Trace-Id response header on every /api/* call — 32-hex W3C trace-id (lowercase). Format matches the W3C Trace Context spec section 3.2.2.4.
  • Addedtraceparent response header on every /api/* call — full W3C v00 trace context string (00-<trace-id>-<span-id>-<flags>). Conforms to W3C Trace Context Recommendation.
  • ChangedInbound traceparent header is now honoured — when a request arrives with a valid traceparent, AtmanID chains the customer trace through. When absent, trace-id is deterministically derived from request_id (SHA-256 first 16 bytes) so the same request_id always maps to the same trace-id within a tenant.
  • ChangedX-Request-Id (req_<ulid>) is unchanged and remains the identifier recorded on audit records. The new W3C headers add distributed-trace continuity for OpenTelemetry users.

April 2026

v1.7.0

managed_by ownership tag — GitOps boundary for multi-workflow tenants.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/agents body — optional managed_by field (1-100 chars). When set, the agent is tagged with managed-by:<value> and downstream consumers can filter by ownership. Strongly recommended for any GitOps consumer.
  • AddedGET /api/v1/agents query — optional managed_by filter. Matches agents tagged with managed-by:<value>. Our GitHub Action consumer uses this as the GitOps boundary so a workflow only diffs against agents it owns.
  • AddedAgentSummary response — managed_by field (extracted from tags array). Surfaces in GET /api/v1/agents response so consumers can verify ownership before mover/leaver.
  • FixedGitOps consumer safety hardening — a small manifest could previously be treated as authoritative for the entire tenant, deactivating unrelated agents. managed_by ownership closes this on the architectural side; the action also ships a max_deactivates safety guard as belt-and-braces. Both ship in v1.7.0.
v1.6.0

Three NEW agent lifecycle endpoints completing mover/leaver coverage for non-human identities.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/agents — paginated list of agents in the tenant. Filters: status, environment, name_prefix, include_deleted. Sort: name (default) or registered_at, asc/desc. Returns AgentSummary[] in standard pagination envelope. Required scope: read:nhi.
  • AddedPATCH /api/v1/agents/{id} — mover semantics. Partial update of mutable fields (framework, model, owner_team, owner_email, environment, vendor, purpose). Immutable: id, name, type (rename = leaver + joiner). Idempotent on idempotency_key (24h window). 409 on DEPROVISIONED agent. Required scope: write:nhi. Audits AGENT_UPDATED with previous_state + diff.
  • AddedPOST /api/v1/agents/{id}/deactivate — leaver semantics. Soft delete: status becomes DEPROVISIONED and the agent is marked deleted; nothing is hard-deleted. Idempotent on idempotency_key (24h window). Already-deactivated returns 200 no-op. Optional reason field surfaces in the audit trail for compliance. Required scope: write:nhi. Audits AGENT_DEACTIVATED.
v1.5.0

NEW endpoint POST /api/v1/agents — register non-human identities (NHIs / service accounts / AI agents). Pairs with /jml/joiner (human-only) to give v1 full identity-creation coverage.

  • AddedPOST /api/v1/agents — creates a non-human identity in PENDING_REVIEW status. Idempotent on idempotency_key (24h window). Required scope: write:nhi. Body shape: { idempotency_key, name, type, owner_team, owner_email, [framework, model, environment, vendor, purpose] }. Returns 201 with { ok, agent_id, status, advisory, message, next_step } or 200 with { ok, cached: true, agent_id, status, original_processed_at } on idempotent replay. 409 on name conflict (any status — operator must clear prior registration first). First consumer: our GitHub Action.
v1.4.0

Versioning + deprecation policy locked. Sunset/Deprecation/Link header support shipped.

  • AddedDeprecation policy published — semantic versioning on the contract, 6-month minimum deprecation window for breaking changes, and explicit /api/v1/* vs /api/v2/* path segregation when v2 ships.
  • AddedDeprecated endpoints now send RFC 8594 Sunset, RFC 9745 Deprecation and Link (successor) headers automatically, so clients can detect a deprecation from any response.
  • ChangedChangelogEntry.changes[] items now support optional deprecated_at, sunset_at, replacement, and rfc fields. Consumers polling /api/v1/changelog.json can react programmatically to type: "deprecated" entries.
v1.3.0

Request correlation extended to the web app; standard error envelope applied platform-wide.

  • AddedAudit records written by actions in the AtmanID web app now carry a request_id too, as records from /api/v1/* calls already did.
  • ChangedThe standard error envelope { error: { code, message, request_id, details? } } now applies across the web app's endpoints as well as /api/v1/*.
  • ChangedGET /api/v1/audit ?request_id= filter scope expanded — previously only matched v1 calls, now matches the full session-route surface too.
  • AddedLib-side requestId threading completed for downstream audit emissions: executeDecideWorkflow (APPROVAL_STAGE_APPROVED/REJECTED), handleSingleItem + handleBatchItems (ACCESS_REQUEST_SOD_BLOCKED/WARNING).
v1.2.0

Audit attribution — actor name/email snapshot and request correlation on /audit.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/audit response now includes actor_name + actor_email + actor_name_source + api_key_id + request_id fields.
  • AddedNew filter params on GET /api/v1/audit: ?actor_name= (ILIKE prefix) and ?actor_email= (case-insensitive).
  • SecurityGDPR-redacted audit rows surface actor_name="[REDACTED]" — name/email snapshots are immutable post-write except for explicit GDPR redaction.
v1.1.0

OpenAPI 3.1 spec generated from the API's own schemas, plus a request_id correlation header.

  • AddedGET /api/v1/openapi and /api/v1/openapi.json now serve an OpenAPI 3.1 spec generated from the API's own schemas (replacing a hand-maintained file).
  • AddedX-Request-Id response header on every /api/v1/* call. ULID format (req_<26 chars>). Echoes inbound X-Request-Id when supplied; generates one when absent. The same value is recorded on the matching audit records.
  • AddedRate limiting per API key. A limited call returns 429 with a Retry-After header.
  • AddedUsage of every /api/v1/* call is recorded, correlated with audit records by request_id.

March 2026

v1.0.0

Initial public v1 contract — 21 endpoints with bearer-token auth.

  • Added21 /api/v1/* endpoints across applications, users, access-requests, entitlements, bundles, sod, jml, webhooks, audit, identities, github. Bearer token auth via API key issued from the API Keys page.